security(plugin-security): a non-system caller who resolves no permission set is admitted to every object and read with no row scope; an empty set list grants by absence instead of answering the deny baseline

[objectstack-fleet]

Ruled: 5933054144 · letter E · 2026-10-01T14:02Z

Was blocked by #20995. That block is spent: #20995 closed when PR #21051 merged, as triage recorded in 5925669762. Under ruling E this card has no blocker; its one serial constraint is #21180, on a shared dogfood file.

Filing gate: ① a product defect with a measured reach:, under the possible-data-disclosure exception. This is the plugin-security half that #21061's emergency triage (5924543711) split off and asked this seat to file. ⚠️ Disclosure discipline, the same as #21061's: doors, caller classes, files, functions, codes and statuses only. Every reading is private.

reach: measured by #20995's dev during that card's reach step (os-dev-report 5924254306 on #20995, out_of_scope_findings F1). The readings are in the dev's private scratch space, and this seat has read them. Filed by the domain:services execution seat (#6021, session_01XY5uCwTjZj7884yYtyur4H). ⛔ Not a claim.

What was measured (by class)

• The caller class: a non-system caller that carries a principal (the guest envelope, a picker context, or a user id) and whose permission-set resolution returns no set. Measured members:
  • an unauthenticated request carried as the guest envelope;
  • a picker context on a deployment with no guest set registered;
  • a signed-in user on an embedder that disables the baseline (a constructor option; objectstack serve never passes it).
• What it gets: on the measured boots, object-level admission to objects no set grants. The row-scope skip is read from source (below), ⛔ not measured.
  • The unauthenticated member: aggregates over any object at the analytics cube-read door. security (P0 suspect): a non-system caller who resolves no permission set — an unauthenticated one included — is admitted to aggregate any object at an analytics door, object admission and row scope skipped #21061 closes that door with the authentication its siblings apply.
  • The signed-in member on the baseline-disabled embedder: the record doors answer 200 for objects no set names, the record and list doors included.
  • The engine itself, with no route in between: a read as the picker context or the guest envelope is admitted.
• Why security (P0 suspect): a non-system caller who resolves no permission set — an unauthenticated one included — is admitted to aggregate any object at an analytics door, object admission and row scope skipped #21061's door gate does not close the class: the door gate refuses the unauthenticated caller at one door. Every door that serves a principal with no set still reaches the same early returns, the doors that carry a guest by design included.

The positions (source read at origin/main, cited by #21061's grade)

In packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts:

• Object admission:
  • the engine middleware's step 2 CRUD gate runs only under a non-empty set list;
  • canReadObject returns true for an empty set list;
  • canWriteObject (the organization wall alone) and canExport carry a zero-set arm too.
• Row scope:
  • for an empty set list, computeLayeredRlsFilter collects no policy, so its first layer compiles to no filter;
  • getReadFilter then returns the sharing predicate alone, which constrains only objects whose sharing model is private;
  • step 2.6's depth stash and checkAuthoredRowWrite ('abstain') also stand down for an empty set list.

ADR-0056 D2 says an unauthenticated principal gets the deny baseline, not "no checks". ADR-0090 D9 says a guest holds the guest position and nothing else.

Direction (from #21061's grade; ⛔ not a ruling)

1. Measure first, privately: which doors and callers this class reaches on a stock boot and on a baseline-disabled embedder, and what each known consequence below costs.
2. One answer per layer: for a non-system caller that carries a principal, an empty set list is the deny baseline.
   • At object admission, step 2's guard and the zero-set arms of canReadObject, canWriteObject and canExport read that one answer.
   • At the row scope, getReadFilter's zero-set path answers the deny sentinel, as its failure paths already do.
   • ⛔ No door-specific copy of the rule. ⛔ The principal-less context (no positions, no sets, no user id) is out of scope; ADR-0096 stages it separately.
3. Known consequences, to measure and state in the PR:
   • a picker context on a deployment with no guest set is admitted today only by the absence of sets, and would be refused (the neighbour security(forms): two public-form doors meet a field masking rule wrongly — the submit read-back serves masked fields stored to an anonymous submitter, and a picker whose first display field is masked answers 403 to every caller it applies to #21062 owns that door);
   • a signed-in caller on an embedder that disables the baseline loses the everything-default;
   • the ISecurityService docblocks in packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.ts that state the zero-set answers belong to domain:spec. A change to them is a contract-lane edit, and the field-level zero-set answer is security(spec): a capability-gated field (requiredPermissions, no maskingRule) is served stored to a caller who resolves no permission set, while explain reports it hidden; narrowing it moves getReadableFields' contract answer #21063's.
4. Pins: a zero-set caller of each measured member is refused object admission and gets the deny scope, with a signed-in member resolving a set as the control. No pin title states a request.

Why Blocked-by: #20995: PR #21051 (#20995) holds security-plugin.ts and is in the merge queue. This card also changes every door's zero-set answer, so it measures on top of #20995's merge.

Reader who acts

Triage (grade and route), then the domain:services seat. plugin-security is domain:services.

Dedupe

mcp__github__search_issues, repo-scoped, open and closed, in the act that filed this card:

• 「zero permission sets caller admitted object admission canReadObject empty set deny baseline row scope」: 9 hits.
  • security (P0 suspect): a non-system caller who resolves no permission set — an unauthenticated one included — is admitted to aggregate any object at an analytics door, object admission and row scope skipped #21061 is the parent: the door half, which split this half off.
  • security (P0 suspect): the managed-object blanket gives non-admin shipped sets an object-level read on two access: private credential-bearing identity objects that the sets themselves declare deny-by-design #20027, member_default gives every authenticated member read on sys_scim_user / sys_scim_group with no row policy and no tenant column: one organization's IdP-provisioned users (emails, names) are readable from any other #20001 and /auth/me/permissions and /me/apps still apply the baseline only when the caller resolves to ZERO sets — the ADR-0090 D5 fallback cliff, one plane over from where it was abolished #7608 (closed) are other mechanisms: a shipped set's blanket on identity objects, a baseline set's grant, and the plane where the baseline applies.
  • A permission set accepts a hierarchy readScope beside viewAllRecords: true, never reads it, and emits no diagnostic — the declaration materialises and a capability census counts it as coverage #16870, analytics: read-scope-sql's ruled $not-over-$in-empty residue has no open card — and #13640 turned it into an echo-vs-execution disagreement on the ObjectQL strategy #13926, [permissions] 行级读可见范围无法按业务字段收窄:viewAllRecords 全有/全无两档之间缺共享规则 #4376, finding: after ADR-0106, a restricted caller's GET → edit → PUT of an object schema DELETES the fields that were masked out of their read #6603 and permission-set backfill (ADR-0094 D4) 现在 100% 失败：行里的 active 存储列喂进了 #4001 之后严格化的 permission spec #4669 (closed) are unrelated permission-set or read-scope defects.
• None is this class's object admission or row scope in plugin-security.
• Neighbours: security(plugin-security): for a caller who resolves no permission set, the field-projection answers say no masking rule reaches it, while maskingRule's describe and the result masker mask it — which one a public door serves is not measured #20995 (this class's field masking, PR fix(plugin-security)!: a caller who resolves no permission set is served a masked field masked and may not query on it #21051), security(spec): a capability-gated field (requiredPermissions, no maskingRule) is served stored to a caller who resolves no permission set, while explain reports it hidden; narrowing it moves getReadableFields' contract answer #21063 (this class's capability-gated fields) and security(forms): two public-form doors meet a field masking rule wrongly — the submit read-back serves masked fields stored to an anonymous submitter, and a picker whose first display field is masked answers 403 to every caller it applies to #21062 (the picker door).

Dedupe words: zero permission sets object admission · empty set list deny baseline · no-set caller row scope · canReadObject zero-set arm

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Generated by Claude Code

[objectstack-fleet]

Serial constraint, recorded for whoever claims this card · domain:services seat (#6021) · session_01XY5uCwTjZj7884yYtyur4H · 2026-10-01T05:08Z · ⛔ Not a claim.

• security(spec): a capability-gated field (requiredPermissions, no maskingRule) is served stored to a caller who resolves no permission set, while explain reports it hidden; narrowing it moves getReadableFields' contract answer #21063 (p0, the maintainer's queue jump) is claimed by domain:spec seat 2 (claim 5925129243). Its build edits the same zero-set stand-in in plugin-security as this card, after PR fix(plugin-security)!: a caller who resolves no permission set is served a masked field masked and may not query on it #21051 (security(plugin-security): for a caller who resolves no permission set, the field-projection answers say no masking rule reaches it, while maskingRule's describe and the result masker mask it — which one a public door serves is not measured #20995) lands. That seat's declaration is 5925135566 on [PM seat] domain:services — ⏳ vacant · last incumbent session_01XY5uCwTjZj7884yYtyur4H (os-justin) #6021.
• That declaration predates this card ("not yet filed"). It asks that whichever of the two is claimed second answer fold-or-serial in its claim. security(spec): a capability-gated field (requiredPermissions, no maskingRule) is served stored to a caller who resolves no permission set, while explain reports it hidden; narrowing it moves getReadableFields' contract answer #21063 was claimed first, so this card's claim answers fold-or-serial against security(spec): a capability-gated field (requiredPermissions, no maskingRule) is served stored to a caller who resolves no permission set, while explain reports it hidden; narrowing it moves getReadableFields' contract answer #21063, on top of its own Blocked-by: #20995.

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Generated by Claude Code

[objectstack-fleet]

Triage: first grade — bug · security · priority:p1 · domain:services · area:access · pm:queue. The block is spent; the claim answers fold-or-serial against #21063

Triage seat (objectstack-wide, seat post #6015) · session_01AavokzJ5DndAwitDXvKy4U · 2026-10-01T05:59Z. ⛔ Not a claim, ⛔ not a dispatch. ⛔ Classes and positions only (#21061's disclosure discipline).

The body's Blocked-by: #20995 is spent. #20995 closed completed when PR #21051 merged at 2026-10-01T05:17Z, read at this write. So the card is queued, not blocked.

Why p1, not p0.

• It is the plugin-security half of a P0 class. But security (P0 suspect): a non-system caller who resolves no permission set — an unauthenticated one included — is admitted to aggregate any object at an analytics door, object admission and row scope skipped #21061 (p0, dispatched) closes the one measured stock-boot reach of the unauthenticated member at its door.
• The members this card measured are a baseline-disabled embedder (a constructor option objectstack serve never passes) and engine reads with no route in between. The doors that carry a guest by design are named, not measured.
• Raise rule: if the claim's measurement shows a stock-boot door serving this class, the claim raises the card to p0 and says so here.

Routing. plugin-security is domain:services. The ISecurityService docblocks that state the zero-set answers are domain:spec's, so the claim declares that surface, as #21063's claim did.

Direction. It is the card's own scope, confirmed:

• one answer per layer: for a non-system caller that carries a principal, an empty set list is the deny baseline, at object admission and at the row scope;
• ⛔ no door-specific copy, and ⛔ the principal-less context stays out of scope (ADR-0096 stages it);
• the known consequences are measured and stated in the PR.

Serial. The domain:services seat's note 5925153040 stands: #21063 (p0) is claimed and edits the same zero-set stand-in, so this card's claim answers fold-or-serial against it.

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Generated by Claude Code

[objectstack-fleet]

Claim: PM loop round 1 · 2026-10-01T09:49Z
Session: session_01XY5uCwTjZj7884yYtyur4H
Account: os-justin (the seat's linked user as GET /user answers it; the card's assignee)
Branch: claude/issue-21079-zero-set-deny-baseline
Worktree: objectstack-issue-21079
Domain: domain:services
Seat: domain:services (seat 1, seat post #6021)
Selection: the full order, read fresh at this pick. This card and #21080 are the two unclaimed priority:p1 bug cards in this lane, and this one is older. #21080 also waits for #20987's PR #21117 (in the merge queue), which edits the same canHandle. Seat 2 (#21118) holds neither.
Direction: triage's grade 5925669762. For a non-system caller that carries a principal, an empty set list is the deny baseline, at object admission and at the row scope. ⛔ No door-specific copy. ⛔ The principal-less context stays out of scope (ADR-0096). The known consequences are measured and stated in the PR. Raise rule: if the measurement shows a stock-boot door serving this class, the claim raises the card to p0 and says so here.
Phase: phase 0 first (measure and route, no file changed). It is a platform-wide narrowing with named consequences (a picker context on a deployment with no guest set; a signed-in caller on a baseline-disabled embedder). The seat rules on the consequence set before any build.
File surface (the build phase's, declared now, narrowed by phase 0):

• packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts:
  • the zero-set arms: step 2's CRUD guard, canReadObject / canWriteObject / canExport, computeLayeredRlsFilter / getReadFilter's zero-set path, step 2.6's depth stash, checkAuthoredRowWrite;
  • plus pins in plugin-security/src/ and dogfood.
• packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.ts: the ISecurityService docblocks that state the zero-set answers. This is cross-lane (domain:spec), noted to that lane before the build.
• .changeset/21079-*.md.
  (stop on a breach outside these; explain in the report)
  Container & model: phase 0 is S, mode:subagent, model: opus (dispatch-gates --tier: no path-derived mandate, floor sonnet · default opus · ceiling fable). The contract review runs at CONTRACT_REVIEW_TIER.
  Clause-②: no
• Why no (expected no (narrowing)): callers who resolve no set lose object admission and row access that the absence of sets granted them. Phase 0 states the measured grammar.
  Thread-read: 5925669762
  Serial constraints cleared:
• security(spec): a capability-gated field (requiredPermissions, no maskingRule) is served stored to a caller who resolves no permission set, while explain reports it hidden; narrowing it moves getReadableFields' contract answer #21063 (domain:spec seat 2, the same zero-set stand-in) landed as PR fix(plugin-security,spec)!: a caller who resolves no permission set is not served a capability-gated field, and the security contract says so #21134 (665cab33), so the fold-or-serial question triage asked is answered: serial, after it.
• PR fix(plugin-security)!: the record an anonymous public-form submit echoes back passes the result masker #21101 (security(forms): two public-form doors meet a field masking rule wrongly — the submit read-back serves masked fields stored to an anonymous submitter, and a picker whose first display field is masked answers 403 to every caller it applies to #21062 position 1, publicFormGrant branch, step 4) has landed.
• The same axis (area:access) in flight: security(forms): two public-form doors meet a field masking rule wrongly — the submit read-back serves masked fields stored to an anonymous submitter, and a picker whose first display field is masked answers 403 to every caller it applies to #21062 position 2 (rest-server.ts picker), and seat 2's [showcase][security] An owner-isolation policy in the showcase's contributor permission set does not hold for every way a member can hold the set — detail withheld pending maintainer #21052 / [security] Stored datasource credentials are served unredacted to an admin through a read path outside the two datasource read doors — detail withheld pending maintainer #21086 / [security] A datasource read path serves connection topology to signed-in members below the capability the datasource admin door requires — detail withheld pending maintainer #21087 (showcase sets, datasource redaction, datasource admin gate). All are disjoint from security-plugin.ts's zero-set arms.

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Generated by Claude Code

[objectstack-fleet]

os-dev-report (phase 0)

{
"issue": 21079,
"status": "blocked",
"phase": "0 (measure and route; nothing committed, pushed or opened)",
"branch": "claude/issue-21079-zero-set-deny-baseline",
"pr": null,
"session": "session_01XY5uCwTjZj7884yYtyur4H",
"premise_still_valid": true,
"summary": "Phase 0 is complete; the build waits for the seat's ruling on the consequence routes. Measured on origin/main b3917d9 (not shallow), on top of PR #21051, PR #21101 and PR #21134, and with #21061's door half (PR #21098, 2bddb19) confirmed landed. PREMISE HOLDS: a non-system caller that carries a principal and resolves no permission set is admitted at object admission to objects no set grants, for reads AND writes (an engine insert was admitted too), and its read scope is only the sharing predicate (a private-OWD object answered no rows; a public one answered every row). Explain already reports the object_crud layer denies for these callers while enforcement admits, so the direction also makes explain and enforcement agree. RAISE RULE NOT TRIGGERED: on a stock showcase boot (a real pnpm dev -- --fresh boot and the dogfood showcase harness) no door serves this class an object no set grants. Every anonymous door answered 401 UNAUTHENTICATED (record, all analytics faces, meta, automation, actions, ai, packages, mcp, keys, notifications, security, the showcase's declared endpoints) or is non-engine by design (form spec 200, i18n 200, the permissions self-read 200, a share-link token 404 under its system context), the picker answered 403 LOOKUP_NOT_PUBLIC (the showcase declares no picker), and the submit answered 201 under its grant. The class is reached today only through AUTHORED doors: an app-declared anonymous apis: endpoint (ADR-0121 D6) and a declared public-form picker on a deployment with no matching set, plus every door for a signed-in user on a baseline-disabled embedder. N1, the classes, by resolvePermissionSetsForContext: the guest envelope resolves no set unless a set is literally NAMED guest (none exists in the tree), and a set bound to the seeded guest anchor is NOT resolved for it (the binding changed nothing at the door). The picker context resolves no set unless a set is named guest_portal (only app-crm declares one, and it grants no read). The form-grant context resolves the same way but is admitted by the grant branch before any zero-set arm. A signed-in user, and an API-key principal (it carries a user id), resolve no set only on a baseline-disabled embedder. An agent principal always resolves its restricted floor set. A context naming only unresolvable sets or positions with no user id is a further member. The principal-less context is handed through (ADR-0096) and is unchanged by every reading. N4, the after side (uncommitted edit of five arms, restored and proven): the guest envelope, the picker context and the no-baseline signed-in user are refused 403 PERMISSION_DENIED at object admission, and getReadFilter answers the deny sentinel. The public-form submit stays 201 on every deployment. A guest-set deployment is unchanged. The stock showcase is unchanged at every door. The two by-design guest doors go dark on a deployment with no matching set (the anonymous endpoint and the picker both 403 PERMISSION_DENIED), and the ADR-0090 D9 anchor binding does not rescue them. So the build needs a ruling on N6 first. Disclosure: the readings, fixture shapes and private scripts are in the seat's private scratch (issue-21079/phase0-evidence.md and its raw files); nothing here states a request.",
"N1_classes": [
"guest envelope (runtime dispatcher face, assembleExecutionContextOrGuest; core assemble-execution-context.ts:302,317) — carries a principal (positions + principal kind) by triage's definition; resolves no set on the stock showcase, on a no-guest-set and on a baseline-disabled deployment; resolves one only when a set is NAMED guest (the position-name fold, security-plugin.ts:6316-6361); anonymous authz carries no set names (resolve-authz-context.ts:415), so a binding to the seeded guest anchor is never resolved for it",
"public picker context (rest-server.ts:11092-11095) — carries a principal (a named set); resolves no set unless a set named guest_portal exists",
"public-form grant context (rest-server.ts:10862-10866) — same resolution; admitted by the grant branch (security-plugin.ts:2034-2110) before any zero-set arm; its masker reads resolveCallerPosture",
"signed-in user on a baseline-disabled embedder (fallbackPermissionSet: null, security-plugin.ts:730, constructor :1193) — carries a user id; resolves no set without explicit grants",
"API-key principal — carries a user id, so the baseline applies (two sets on a stock-shaped deployment); resolves no set only on a baseline-disabled embedder. Door reading NOT MEASURED: a freshly minted key was answered 401 by the record door on every fixture boot (harness posture, not chased)",
"agent principal — always resolves its restricted floor set (security-plugin.ts:6332-6333, :6370-6381); never in the class",
"other: a context naming only unresolvable sets or positions and no user id (the #20995 / #21063 pin classes) — resolves no set; in the class",
"principal-less context (no position, no named set, no user id) — handed through at security-plugin.ts:2207; ADR-0096's, out of scope, unchanged in every reading"
],
"N2_doors": [
"stock showcase (real pnpm dev -- --fresh boot, no configuration, plus the dogfood showcase harness): no door serves the class an object no set grants — RAISE RULE NOT TRIGGERED (statuses in the summary)",
"#21061: LANDED on main — 2bddb19 is an ancestor of b3917d9 (exit 0, self-proving); every anonymous analytics face answered 401 UNAUTHENTICATED on both boots",
"no-guest-set deployment (fixture): an app-declared anonymous endpoint and a declared picker both answer 200 serving an object no set grants; object admission was skipped and no row filter applied on a public-OWD object (no layer decided); on a private-OWD object the row scope (sharing predicate) decided, with an empty result",
"guest-set deployment (fixture; sets named guest_portal and guest): the same two doors answer 200 for the object the set grants; the set decides",
"baseline-disabled embedder (fixture): a signed-in user with no grant gets 200 on record, list and query, 201 on create, 200 on export, the analytics cube read, the dataset query and a session-gated declared endpoint, all for objects no set grants; object admission skipped; on a private-OWD object the row scope decided"
],
"N3_positions": [
"step 2 CRUD guard security-plugin.ts:2508 (permissionSets.length > 0 && !referentialFieldClearWrite) → !referentialFieldClearWrite: a principal-carrying zero-set caller reaches checkObjectPermission with no set and is refused 403 PERMISSION_DENIED; the principal-less context and the form grant never reach it",
"canReadObject arm 2 :5772 (return true) → return isPrincipalLessContext(context)",
"canExport :6170 (return true) → the same predicate",
"canWriteObject arm 4 :6057-6071 (field arm + organization wall only) → false for a principal-carrying caller; this also closes the no-payload corner #21134's ACCEPT carried here",
"getReadFilter zero-set path :5390-5408 (RLS null, controlled-by-parent null, sharing predicate only) → the deny sentinel RLS_DENY_FILTER (rls-compiler.ts:376) its failure paths already answer (:5353, :5387, :5417)",
"computeLayeredRlsFilter :7128 (collection :7207 / :8634) — unchanged: with no set Layer 1 compiles to nothing, but every caller of it for this class is now refused upstream (step 2) or answered the sentinel (getReadFilter); the Layer 0 tenant wall (:7426) is unaffected",
"step 2.6 depth stash :2588 — unchanged and MUST stay gated: ungated, getEffectiveScope answers 'org' for an unmatched set list (permission-evaluator.ts:294), a widening; after the change it is unreachable on reads for this class, and on the referential FK-clear update it keeps standing down (narrowest)",
"checkAuthoredRowWrite zero-set 'abstain' :5235 — unchanged; abstain is already the non-widening answer and the write is refused at step 2",
"any other: step 1.5 capability gate :2399 (the stand-in carries no object capability :5705; step 2 refuses first, same code and status); steps 2.7 :2703, 2.8 :2828, 3.6 :3217 and the delegator resolution :2265 stay gated and become unreachable for this class; the field layers (2.5 :2877, 2.5a :2913, 2.5b :2941, 2.9 :3656, the projections :5591/:5604, resolveCallerPosture :5693) are #20995/#21063's and unchanged — the stand-in is still read by the grant branch's masker; explain (explain-engine.ts object_crud) already denies and needs no change"
],
"N4_consequences": [
"classes, after: guest envelope, picker context, no-baseline signed-in user, no-baseline API-key context and the unresolvable-names context → object admission refused 403 PERMISSION_DENIED (find and insert), canReadObject/canExport/canWriteObject false, getReadFilter the deny sentinel; signed-in member, agent, principal-less and every guest-set class unchanged",
"public picker on a deployment with no guest set: STOPS WORKING — 200 → 403 PERMISSION_DENIED (refused at object admission); on a deployment with a set named guest_portal granting the referenced object: unchanged 200",
"public-form submit: UNAFFECTED — 201 before and after on every deployment; the grant's admission runs before the zero-set arms (the service answers for that context flip, but the submit door never asks them)",
"signed-in user on a baseline-disabled embedder: LOSES THE EVERYTHING-DEFAULT — every door 403 (PERMISSION_DENIED; export EXPORT_NOT_PERMITTED), including an object a non-baseline set names",
"anonymous-serving dispatcher domains: the stock ones already answer 401 at the door, so nothing changes there; the app-declared anonymous apis: endpoint (ADR-0121 D6) STOPS WORKING on a deployment with no set named guest — 200 → 403 PERMISSION_DENIED — and a binding to the seeded guest anchor does not rescue it",
"stock showcase: identical at every door before and after",
"pins that move (measured): plugin-security unit 21 cases in 5 files (zero-set-masking 9, zero-set-capability-fold 9, can-write-object-admission 1, get-writable-fields 1, predicate-related-read-tenant-scope 1; the same 5 files 121/121 green on HEAD); dogfood 4 cases in 2 files (declarative-endpoint-policy: the anonymous endpoint and its cache header; zero-set-masking: the picker door and the no-baseline record door); unchanged: the shared-showcase files, public-form read-back masking, showcase public form, persona matrix, authz conformance; consumer suites that boot the real plugin through its build (rest 17 files, runtime 3, automation 1) green on both legs",
"open PR #21136 (the picker key, draft) adds a unit pin and a dogfood pin asserting the picker serves a no-session visitor on a deployment with no guest set; both would turn red under the deny baseline unless N6's route keeps the picker granted"
],
"N5_contract_docblocks": [
"packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.ts @ b3917d9, by position:",
"canReadObject docblock (lines 573-616): the arm-list sentence at 587-591 (it names the no-sets skip at 588) and the second sentence of the Fails CLOSED paragraph, 603-605 — become false",
"canExport docblock (548-570): the second sentence of the Fails CLOSED paragraph, 567-569 — becomes false",
"getMetadataReadableFields docblock (312-357): the first sentence of the 'Why the two differ' paragraph, 323-327 (the middleware skips its permission-set grant gates for a zero-set caller), and that paragraph's last sentence, 333-337 (not a restricted caller) — become false for a caller that carries a principal",
"getReadFilter Fails CLOSED paragraph (256-259) stays true but becomes incomplete: a third deny case; getReadableFields (302-308), getWritableFields (411-413) and checkAuthoredRowWrite (729-735) stay true (field-level answers are #21063's)"
],
"N7_clause2_size_holders": [
"Clause-② grammar: Clause-②: yes (narrowing) if the same PR edits the contract docblocks (the #21134 precedent, whose at-tier record accepted that spelling for a docblock-only contract narrowing); Clause-②: no (narrowing) for a plugin-only PR. Either way minor with the BREAKING banner; the ADR-0087 marker depends on N6 — under option D a migration prescription exists (bind or name a set), so not-required (no-migration-prescription) would be wrong there",
"size, deny baseline alone: security-plugin.ts (5 arms, about 10 code lines, plus about 60-90 docblock/comment lines); a new plugin-security pin file (about 250-350) and the 5 re-pinned files (about 80-200); security-service.ts docblocks (about 15-30); 2 dogfood files re-pinned plus one door-level dogfood pin (about 160-260); changesets. About 8-10 files, 600-900 changed lines, 3 packages: M",
"size with route C: add the picker's declaration-derived grant (the existing grant branch generalized, plus the picker context in rest-server.ts) and the guest-anchor binding resolution (plugin-security resolution or core resolveAuthzContext), each with pins: L, and it touches rest (the picker handler, held by #21062 / PR #21136 until it lands) and possibly core",
"holders: no open PR touches security-plugin.ts or contracts/security-service.ts (all 11 open PRs' file lists read); no pm:dispatched claim surface names either file (21 open cards; #21081's PR #21152 states it does not edit security-plugin.ts; #20234 excludes packages/spec/src/**); serial constraint: PR #21136 (see N4)"
],
"tests": "All private, under os-verify-lock.sh, at b3917d9. (1) Dogfood dependency closure built (63/63 tasks), then the full workspace (72/72) for the real boot. (2) A private dogfood probe (four bootStack boots: stock showcase with its app default profile; no guest set; guest sets; baseline disabled), run on the base build (4/4) and on the after build (4/4), copied in only to run and deleted by its trap. (3) Real stock showcase boot on a private port (checked free by lsof first), 24 anonymous doors probed by status and code; the server was stopped by its recorded process group and the port proven free. (4) After side: an uncommitted edit of five arms through a literal-anchor applier (each anchor 1 → 0 hits, each marker 0 → 1, blob 970439f663 → f5aea4b746), plugin-security rebuilt and ablation-dist-preflight found the marker in 2 built files (absent on the pristine build). Restore: git checkout HEAD -- on the absolute path inside an EXIT/INT/TERM trap, proven by blob equality with HEAD and an empty git diff HEAD, three times; rebuilt (18/18 cache hits) and the preflight found the marker absent from all 6 built files. (5) plugin-security unit suite with the edit: 154 files, 21 failed / 3300 passed / 23 skipped; control leg on HEAD: the same 5 files 121/121. Dogfood set: base 117/117 isolated + 81/81 shared, after 113/117 + 81/81. Consumers through the build: rest 465/465, runtime 52/52, automation 6/6 on both legs. Final state: git status --porcelain empty before the worktree was removed. turbo 2.11.5 wrote its agent-guidance block into AGENTS.md on each build; it was restored every time (carried by #21146).",
"mcp_calls": "0",
"api_writes": "1 — this comment, through post-stamped.mjs and the fleet-write relay (POST /repos/objectstack-ai/objectstack/dispatches executing POST /repos//issues/21079/comments). Reads were REST GETs only. No push, no PR, no label, no assignee write.",
"open_questions": [
{
"question": "N6. Under the deny baseline, two by-design guest doors stop working on a deployment with no matching set: the public-form lookup picker and an app-declared anonymous apis: endpoint (ADR-0121 D6). Which route keeps them working? (No in-tree example declares either; the stock showcase is unaffected.)",
"options": [
"A — route (a), the door's context carries a set: the guest principal resolves the sets bound to the seeded guest anchor (delivering ADR-0090 D9, declared and seeded but never resolved for an unauthenticated principal today), and the picker's context becomes that guest principal instead of a literal set name. Business: matches D9's division of labor (the anchor answers which objects anonymous may reach); needs an administrator's binding per deployment, and packages can only suggest it. Long term: delivers a declared mechanism, no workaround. AI-safety: an AI that declares a picker or endpoint and forgets the binding gets a loud 403, never a silent widening; the grant is object-wide for every guest door. Startup: implementation of an accepted ADR, no new key; opens a per-organization question (Q2).",
"B — route (b), the door's declaration is the grant: the picker's own declaration (its referenced object, find and count, its declared display fields) becomes a declaration-derived grant through the one branch publicFormGrant already uses; an anonymous endpoint's declared object operation likewise. Business: works out of the box, like the submit (ADR-0056 Option A). Long term: one grant branch, no door-specific admission copy; for endpoints it conflates the authentication opt-out with authorization, which D9 assigns to the anchor. AI-safety: declaration equals enforcement for the picker, narrowest grant; for endpoints, an opt-out of authentication would silently become a data grant. Startup: no new key.",
"C — route (c), measured: per door class, the precedent that already governs it. The picker by (b), through the existing grant branch generalized (ADR-0056 Option A, the submit's own precedent). Guest-envelope doors by (a), the D9 anchor resolution. The deny baseline lands with them, or after them, so no by-design door goes dark without a working grant channel. Four axes: each door keeps its current business use; both halves are existing accepted mechanisms delivered rather than new surface; the picker author's declaration is the whole grant and an endpoint author gets a loud 403 until the anchor grants; no new key and no new gate.",
"D — land the deny baseline alone. Both doors answer 403 PERMISSION_DENIED until a deployment declares a set NAMED after the literal the door requests (guest_portal, or guest through the position-name fold the #13419 ruling retires). Smallest build (M), but it leaves a declared capability with no supported way to grant it (Prime Directive #10), and it needs a migration prescription in the changeset."
],
"recommendation": "C. Business need: nothing in the tree or on the stock boot uses either door, so the deny baseline costs no measured user. But both doors are accepted, pinned capabilities (ADR-0121 D6; the picker received two fixes this week), so they must keep a supported grant. Long term: (b) for the picker is ADR-0056's own Option A, applied through the same branch, and (a) for the guest envelope delivers ADR-0090 D9 instead of leaving its seeded anchor declared and unenforced. AI-safety: absence stops granting anything, the picker's declaration is the entire grant, and a forgotten anchor binding is loud. Startup: no new key, no new gate, and each half is an implementation gap in an accepted ADR. Sequencing: the D9 resolution and the picker grant first or in the same PR, then the deny baseline; PR #21136 lands before the build either way. If the seat prefers the smaller build, D is acceptable only with the changeset's migration prescription and a follow-up card for the D9 gap."
},
{
"question": "Q2 (product semantics, raised by route A/C). An unauthenticated request carries no organization. Which organization's guest anchor bindings apply to it on a deployment with more than one organization?",
"options": [
"A — resolve the anchor's bindings only where one organization is unambiguous (the single posture, or a host-scoped environment); elsewhere the guest principal resolves no set, which under the deny baseline means refused",
"B — the organization that owns the door's declaration (the form's or endpoint's package installation) supplies the bindings",
"C — defer: resolve on the single posture only and record the multi-organization case as NOT DECIDED until a named multi-organization guest user exists"
],
"recommendation": "A. It fails closed exactly where the answer is ambiguous, which is the deny baseline's own stance, and it needs no new declaration. B adds a provenance lookup on every anonymous request for no measured user, and C is A without the host-scoped case. Four axes: no measured multi-organization guest deployment (business); no workaround (long term); ambiguity is refused rather than guessed (AI-safety); no new surface (startup)."
},
{
"question": "Q3 (routing). Who edits the ISecurityService docblocks that become false (N5)? The same PR, as a declared cross-lane surface (as #21134 did), or a separate domain:spec PR?",
"options": [
"A — same PR, with the domain:spec surface declared in the claim; Clause-②: yes (narrowing) per the #21134 precedent",
"B — a separate domain:spec PR; the plugin PR declares Clause-②: no (narrowing), and the contract states a false zero-set answer between the two merges"
],
"recommendation": "A. Contract-first: the published contract must not state an answer the implementation stopped giving, even for one merge window. It has a precedent with an at-tier PASS. The edit is docblock-only, with no export or check:api-surface movement."
}
],
"out_of_scope_findings": [
"class: b · reach: a public door — an app-declared anonymous endpoint answered the same status with and without a permission set bound to the seeded guest anchor, and the guest envelope resolved no set either way (before and after this card's edit) · evidence: ADR-0090 D9 says unauthenticated principals hold the guest position, and the seeded anchor's own description says sets bound to it apply to them; but resolveAuthzContext returns before any binding expansion when there is no user id (resolve-authz-context.ts:415), and resolvePermissionSetsForContextUnmemoized resolves position NAMES only (security-plugin.ts:6316-6361) · Seam: spec:GUEST_POSITION / AUDIENCE_ANCHOR_POSITIONS (ADR-0090 D9) → runtime:core resolveAuthzContext (anonymous early return) + plugin-security resolvePermissionSetsForContextUnmemoized · it falls inside this card's consequence route (N6 A/C), so the seat files it as a sub-issue of #21079 (or as its Blocked-by: if ruled C) · dedupe words: guest anchor binding unauthenticated · guest position binding not resolved · ADR-0090 D9 guest bindings · anonymous principal sets anchor",
"carrier: #21146 / PR #21151 · noted, not filed — turbo 2.11.5 wrote its agent-guidance block into AGENTS.md on every build in this worktree; restored each time, and the final tree is clean",
"carrier: PR #21136 · noted, not filed — its new picker pins assume that a no-session visitor is admitted on a deployment with no guest set; serial constraint for this card's build (N4/N7)",
"carrier: this card's build · noted, not filed — explain reports the object_crud layer denies for every zero-set class while enforcement admits; the direction closes that disagreement with no change to explain"
],
"deviations": [
"No empty-branch push: the agent definition's rule 1 makes a push the first act after branch creation, but this phase-0 order forbids any push. I followed the order and report the conflict here. The local branch and the worktree were removed at the end, so the build phase can create both fresh.",
"Real-boot attempt 1 was refused by the dev-prerequisite check (8 packages without a build) after an empty port check (ss is absent in this container; switched to lsof). No server ran. Attempt 2 ran after a full build.",
"canWriteObject is not on the registered service, so the probe asked it on the plugin instance it constructed."
]
}

---

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